It was from Batum in Georgia that Gilbert wrote “Turkey and Russia. The Reason for Strained Relations,” published August 27, 1924 in the Morning Post, analyzing the potential for war between Turkey and Russia. After noting that Turkey’s relations with Britain were still strained over Britain’s insistence at the recent conference that her Iraq mandate include the potential oil lands around Mosul, Gilbert pointed out that Turkish fears over Russia’s ambitions to obtain Constantinople, as recently outlined by Trotsky, and even more the ongoing Armenian disputes would likely lead to another war in the region, an opportunity much desired by ambitious Italians.
“Far more serious are all those questions that can be lumped under the heading Armenia. Armenia is now rather a misnomer, since in all that large province there is not an Armenian left alive, except a few girls or children who have been married or adopted by Turks in order to get possession of their property; but the term is useful as a ‘geographical expression.’ In Armenia and Lazistan, parts of which were Russian before the war, and most of which were occupied by it during the war, Russian interests are numerous and varied. The boundaries have been fixed, it is true, and a diligent search through the different Treaties may enable one to trace them on the map, but no one, least of all the people on the spot, know exactly where they run. Therefore frontier incidents occur with monotonous regularity.
Russian properties in Armenia were very extensive, and the claims and counter-claims to these properties have practically produced a diplomatic deadlock. The question is further complicated by the fact that a good many of them were the property of Armenians of Russian nationality, whom the Turks very impartially massacred and confiscated their possessions. Now the Bolsheviks, very naturally, want them back and the Turks, equally naturally, refuse to disgorge. To a European it appears to be the quarrel of two murderers over the division of the spoil. But the Armenians are dead, and ‘les absents ont toujours tort.’ [‘the absent are always in the wrong’]” (Bagnani 1924a)
Gilbert concluded that not only was a war between Russia and Turkey inevitable but also that Mussolini would not hesitate to take advantage of it. Indeed, by June Mussolini was ordering his War Minister, di Giorgio, to prepare plans to invade Turkey, an utterly impossible demand. (Steiner, The Lights that Failed, 2007, pp. 340-41)
“Lastly, the Turks are seriously worried by the relations between Italy and Russia. After Russia the nation they dread most is Italy, whose aspirations in South-Western Anatolia are well known. The retention at Lausanne of Castellorizo [an island off the south coast of Turkey], the establishment of a seaplane base at Leros [in the Dodecanese], and Mussolini’s interest in the Eastern Question have confirmed these fears.
Turkish public opinion is convinced that, besides the official and published Italo-Russian treaty, there is a secret agreement between the two countries for an eventual partition of the Turkish Empire in Asia. It is, of course, highly improbable, not to say impossible, that any such document should exist in black and white, but whether the subject may not have been discussed in conversation is quite another matter. What is certain is that, in the event of a Russo-Turkish war, Mussolini will not remain idle. What is equally certain is that, sooner or later, such a war is bound to take place.” (Bagnani 1924a)
Gilbert was virtually admitting that the partitioning of Turkey was still being discussed by officials in Italy, who believed or hoped that a war between Russia and Turkey was inevitable, and Italy was eager to get her share this time, whether land for her emigrants or some of the natural resources that she lacked. Gilbert was also right in perceiving Mussolini’s undiplomatic and aggressive tactics in the international arena.
Georgia (to be continued)